Threat Model

Overview

This document identifies threats to the Release Orchestrator and their mitigations.

Threat Categories

T1: Credential Theft

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker gains access to credentials through database breach
Attack VectorSQL injection, database backup theft, insider threat
Assets at RiskRegistry credentials, vault tokens, SSH keys
MitigationSecrets NEVER stored in database; only vault references stored
DetectionAnomalous vault access patterns, failed authentication attempts

T2: Token Replay

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker captures and reuses valid JWT tokens
Attack VectorMan-in-the-middle, log file exposure, memory dump
Assets at RiskUser sessions, API access
MitigationShort-lived tokens (15 min), refresh token rotation, TLS everywhere
DetectionToken used from unusual IP, concurrent sessions

T3: Agent Impersonation

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker registers fake agent to receive deployment tasks
Attack VectorStolen registration token, certificate forgery
Assets at RiskDeployment credentials, target access
MitigationOne-time registration tokens, mTLS with CA-signed certs
DetectionRegistration from unexpected network, capability mismatch

T4: Digest Tampering

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker modifies container image after release creation
Attack VectorRegistry compromise, man-in-the-middle at pull time
Assets at RiskApplication integrity, supply chain
MitigationDigest verification at pull time; mismatch = deployment failure
DetectionPull failures due to digest mismatch

T5: Evidence Tampering

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker modifies audit records to hide malicious activity
Attack VectorDatabase admin access, SQL injection
Assets at RiskAudit integrity, compliance
MitigationAppend-only table, cryptographic signing, no UPDATE/DELETE
DetectionSignature verification failure, hash chain break

T6: Privilege Escalation

AspectDescription
ThreatUser gains permissions beyond their role
Attack VectorRole assignment exploit, permission bypass
Assets at RiskEnvironment access, approval authority
MitigationRole-based access, SoD enforcement, audit logs
DetectionUnusual permission patterns, SoD violation attempts

T7: Supply Chain Attack

AspectDescription
ThreatMalicious plugin injected into workflow
Attack VectorPlugin repository compromise, typosquatting
Assets at RiskAll environments, all credentials
MitigationPlugin sandbox, capability declarations, signed manifests
DetectionUnexpected network egress, resource anomalies

T8: Lateral Movement

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker uses compromised target to access others
Attack VectorTarget compromise, credential reuse
Assets at RiskOther targets, environments
MitigationShort-lived task credentials, scoped permissions
DetectionCross-target credential use, unexpected connections

T9: Data Exfiltration

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker extracts logs, artifacts, or configuration
Attack VectorAPI abuse, log aggregator compromise
Assets at RiskApplication data, deployment configurations
MitigationEncryption at rest, network segmentation, audit logging
DetectionLarge data transfers, unusual API patterns

T10: Denial of Service

AspectDescription
ThreatAttacker exhausts resources to prevent deployments
Attack VectorAPI flooding, workflow loop, agent task spam
Assets at RiskService availability
MitigationRate limiting, resource quotas, circuit breakers
DetectionResource exhaustion alerts, traffic spikes

STRIDE Analysis

CategoryThreatsPrimary Mitigations
SpoofingT3 Agent ImpersonationmTLS, registration tokens
TamperingT4 Digest, T5 EvidenceDigest verification, append-only tables
RepudiationEvidence manipulationSigned evidence packets
Information DisclosureT1 Credentials, T9 ExfiltrationVault integration, encryption
Denial of ServiceT10 Resource exhaustionRate limits, quotas
Elevation of PrivilegeT6 EscalationRBAC, SoD enforcement

Trust Boundaries

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         TRUST BOUNDARIES                                    │
│                                                                             │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │ PUBLIC NETWORK (Untrusted)                                          │   │
│  │                                                                      │   │
│  │  Internet, External Users, External Services                        │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                │                                            │
│                                │ TLS + Authentication                       │
│                                ▼                                            │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │ DMZ (Semi-trusted)                                                  │   │
│  │                                                                      │   │
│  │  API Gateway, Webhook Gateway                                       │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                │                                            │
│                                │ Internal mTLS                              │
│                                ▼                                            │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │ INTERNAL NETWORK (Trusted)                                          │   │
│  │                                                                      │   │
│  │  Stella Core Services, Database, Internal Vault                     │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                │                                            │
│                                │ Agent mTLS                                 │
│                                ▼                                            │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │ DEPLOYMENT NETWORK (Controlled)                                     │   │
│  │                                                                      │   │
│  │  Agents, Targets                                                    │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │
│                                                                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Data Classification

ClassificationExamplesProtection Requirements
CriticalVault credentials, signing keysHardware security, minimal access
SensitiveUser tokens, agent certificatesEncryption, access logging
InternalRelease configs, workflow definitionsEncryption at rest
PublicAPI documentation, release namesIntegrity protection

Security Controls Summary

ControlImplementationThreats Addressed
mTLSAgent communicationT3
Short-lived tokens15-min access tokensT2
Vault integrationNo secrets in DBT1
Digest verificationPull-time validationT4
Append-only tablesEvidence immutabilityT5
RBAC + SoDPermission enforcementT6
Plugin sandboxResource limits, capability controlT7
Scoped credentialsTask-specific accessT8
EncryptionAt rest and in transitT9
Rate limitingAPI and resource quotasT10

Incident Response

Detection Signals

SignalIndicatesResponse
Digest mismatch at pullT4 TamperingHalt deployment, investigate registry
Evidence signature failureT5 TamperingPreserve logs, forensic analysis
Unusual agent registrationT3 ImpersonationRevoke agent, review access
SoD violation attemptT6 EscalationBlock action, alert admin
Plugin network egressT7 Supply chainIsolate plugin, review manifest

Response Procedures

  1. Contain - Isolate affected component (revoke token, disable agent)
  2. Investigate - Collect logs, evidence packets, audit trail
  3. Remediate - Patch vulnerability, rotate credentials
  4. Recover - Restore service, verify integrity
  5. Report - Document incident, update threat model

References