This document identifies threats to the Release Orchestrator and their mitigations.
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker gains access to credentials through database breach |
| Attack Vector | SQL injection, database backup theft, insider threat |
| Assets at Risk | Registry credentials, vault tokens, SSH keys |
| Mitigation | Secrets NEVER stored in database; only vault references stored |
| Detection | Anomalous vault access patterns, failed authentication attempts |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker captures and reuses valid JWT tokens |
| Attack Vector | Man-in-the-middle, log file exposure, memory dump |
| Assets at Risk | User sessions, API access |
| Mitigation | Short-lived tokens (15 min), refresh token rotation, TLS everywhere |
| Detection | Token used from unusual IP, concurrent sessions |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker registers fake agent to receive deployment tasks |
| Attack Vector | Stolen registration token, certificate forgery |
| Assets at Risk | Deployment credentials, target access |
| Mitigation | One-time registration tokens, mTLS with CA-signed certs |
| Detection | Registration from unexpected network, capability mismatch |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker modifies container image after release creation |
| Attack Vector | Registry compromise, man-in-the-middle at pull time |
| Assets at Risk | Application integrity, supply chain |
| Mitigation | Digest verification at pull time; mismatch = deployment failure |
| Detection | Pull failures due to digest mismatch |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker modifies audit records to hide malicious activity |
| Attack Vector | Database admin access, SQL injection |
| Assets at Risk | Audit integrity, compliance |
| Mitigation | Append-only table, cryptographic signing, no UPDATE/DELETE |
| Detection | Signature verification failure, hash chain break |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | User gains permissions beyond their role |
| Attack Vector | Role assignment exploit, permission bypass |
| Assets at Risk | Environment access, approval authority |
| Mitigation | Role-based access, SoD enforcement, audit logs |
| Detection | Unusual permission patterns, SoD violation attempts |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Malicious plugin injected into workflow |
| Attack Vector | Plugin repository compromise, typosquatting |
| Assets at Risk | All environments, all credentials |
| Mitigation | Plugin sandbox, capability declarations, signed manifests |
| Detection | Unexpected network egress, resource anomalies |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker uses compromised target to access others |
| Attack Vector | Target compromise, credential reuse |
| Assets at Risk | Other targets, environments |
| Mitigation | Short-lived task credentials, scoped permissions |
| Detection | Cross-target credential use, unexpected connections |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker extracts logs, artifacts, or configuration |
| Attack Vector | API abuse, log aggregator compromise |
| Assets at Risk | Application data, deployment configurations |
| Mitigation | Encryption at rest, network segmentation, audit logging |
| Detection | Large data transfers, unusual API patterns |
| Aspect | Description |
|---|
| Threat | Attacker exhausts resources to prevent deployments |
| Attack Vector | API flooding, workflow loop, agent task spam |
| Assets at Risk | Service availability |
| Mitigation | Rate limiting, resource quotas, circuit breakers |
| Detection | Resource exhaustion alerts, traffic spikes |
| Category | Threats | Primary Mitigations |
|---|
| Spoofing | T3 Agent Impersonation | mTLS, registration tokens |
| Tampering | T4 Digest, T5 Evidence | Digest verification, append-only tables |
| Repudiation | Evidence manipulation | Signed evidence packets |
| Information Disclosure | T1 Credentials, T9 Exfiltration | Vault integration, encryption |
| Denial of Service | T10 Resource exhaustion | Rate limits, quotas |
| Elevation of Privilege | T6 Escalation | RBAC, SoD enforcement |
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TRUST BOUNDARIES │
│ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ PUBLIC NETWORK (Untrusted) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ Internet, External Users, External Services │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ │ TLS + Authentication │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ DMZ (Semi-trusted) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ API Gateway, Webhook Gateway │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ │ Internal mTLS │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ INTERNAL NETWORK (Trusted) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ Stella Core Services, Database, Internal Vault │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ │ Agent mTLS │
│ ▼ │
│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ DEPLOYMENT NETWORK (Controlled) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ Agents, Targets │ │
│ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
| Classification | Examples | Protection Requirements |
|---|
| Critical | Vault credentials, signing keys | Hardware security, minimal access |
| Sensitive | User tokens, agent certificates | Encryption, access logging |
| Internal | Release configs, workflow definitions | Encryption at rest |
| Public | API documentation, release names | Integrity protection |
| Control | Implementation | Threats Addressed |
|---|
| mTLS | Agent communication | T3 |
| Short-lived tokens | 15-min access tokens | T2 |
| Vault integration | No secrets in DB | T1 |
| Digest verification | Pull-time validation | T4 |
| Append-only tables | Evidence immutability | T5 |
| RBAC + SoD | Permission enforcement | T6 |
| Plugin sandbox | Resource limits, capability control | T7 |
| Scoped credentials | Task-specific access | T8 |
| Encryption | At rest and in transit | T9 |
| Rate limiting | API and resource quotas | T10 |
| Signal | Indicates | Response |
|---|
| Digest mismatch at pull | T4 Tampering | Halt deployment, investigate registry |
| Evidence signature failure | T5 Tampering | Preserve logs, forensic analysis |
| Unusual agent registration | T3 Impersonation | Revoke agent, review access |
| SoD violation attempt | T6 Escalation | Block action, alert admin |
| Plugin network egress | T7 Supply chain | Isolate plugin, review manifest |
- Contain - Isolate affected component (revoke token, disable agent)
- Investigate - Collect logs, evidence packets, audit trail
- Remediate - Patch vulnerability, rotate credentials
- Recover - Restore service, verify integrity
- Report - Document incident, update threat model